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Abstract Two experiments were conducted to investigate
the eVects of practice on strategy selection and strategy
eYciency in mental arithmetic. Participants had to solve
simple addition or multiplication problems, after having
received 0, 3, or 6 practice sessions (Experiment 1), and
before and after having received 3 practice sessions (Experi-
ment 2). Strategy selection was measured by means of
trial-by-trial strategy reports, whereas strategy eYciency
was measured by means of response latencies. Results
showed signiWcant practice eVects on retrieval frequency,
procedural frequency, retrieval eYciency, and procedural
eYciency. However, practice eVects on strategy eYciency
appeared to be both strategy-speciWc (i.e., only for proce-
dural strategies) and operation-speciWc (i.e., only for multi-
plication problems). Implications of the present results for
mathematic cognition and its modeling are discussed.
Introduction
Daily, we use several numeric competencies, such as subi-
tizing small quantities, estimating large quantities, calculat-
ing new quantities, etc. Some of these basic competencies,
such as subitizing and estimating, seem to be innate to
human infants (e.g., Butterworth, 1999; Dehaene, 1997;
Spelke & Dehaene, 1999). The mastery of more advanced
numerical skills such as calculation, in contrast, must be
acquired through education, learning, and practice.1
Between the ages of 2 and 4, children learn to count ver-
bally (e.g., Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Wynn, 1990). Once
they master counting, children generalize the counting pro-
cedure to larger numbers, apparently without upper bound
and without explicit training. During their elementary
school years, children learn a set of basic arithmetic facts
and calculation procedures. Slow, deliberate and eVortful
procedures (such as step-by-step counting) are replaced by
fast, eYcient, and less eVortful calculation processes (such
as memory retrieval; e.g., Ashcraft, 1982; Fuson, 1982,
1988; Siegler, 1988; Steel & Funnell, 2001). When reach-
ing adult age, until recently, people were supposed always
to use memory retrieval to solve simple-arithmetic prob-
lems such as 3 + 5 and 6 £ 7 (e.g., Ashcraft, 1992;
McCloskey, 1992). However, more recent studies showed
that this is not absolutely true: even skilled adults are not
always able to retrieve simple-arithmetic facts from their
memory (e.g., LeFevre, Bisanz, Daley, BuVone, Greeen-
ham, & Sadesky, 1996; LeFevre, Sadesky, & Bisanz,
1996). Indeed, many adults use nonretrieval (procedural)
strategies such as counting (e.g., 6 + 3 = 6 + 1 + 1 + 1) and
transformation (e.g., 6 + 7 = 6 + 4 + 3) to solve simple-
arithmetic problems. Other quite surprising results have
been found concerning the arithmetic abilities of normal
educated adults. Geary, Salthouse, Chen, and Fan (1996)
and Geary et al. (1997) showed declines in mental arithme-
tic performance across successive North-American genera-
tions. Comparable results were obtained by Mulhern and
Wylie (2004), who showed that performance levels of
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(such as calculation) dropped devastatingly between 1992
and 2002.
The importance of mental arithmetic in daily life and the
decline of mathematic skill the past few years notwith-
standing, few studies so far investigated the eVects of prac-
tice on strategy selection and strategy eYciency. Practice
eVects in simple arithmetic have been studied in children
(see Kroesbergen & Van Luit, 2003, for a review), and in
brain-damaged adults (e.g., Whetstone, 1998), but nearly
not in healthy adults (but see Fendrich, Healy, & Bourne,
1993; Pauli, Bourne, & Birbaumer, 1998; Rickard, Healy,
& Bourne, 1994). Four questions may be raised: (1) Does
practice increase the use of direct memory retrieval (i.e., a
change in strategy selection)?, (2) Does practice increase
the speed with which retrieval and procedural strategies are
executed (i.e., an increase in strategy eYciency)?, (3) Does
practice reduce the performance diVerences between small
and large problems (i.e., the problem-size eVect)?, and (4)
Do practice eVects transfer to other operations, other sizes,
or other arithmetic problems?
Concerning the Wrst question (i.e., whether practice
inXuences strategy selection), the most prevailing assump-
tion is that practice will inevitably lead to an augmented
usage of retrieval. This assumption is based on the distribu-
tion of associations model (Siegler & Shrager, 1984) and
the instance theory of automatization (Logan, 1988). The
distribution of associations model (Siegler & Shrager,
1984) states that the encoding of a problem results in the
activation of a set of response candidates. The activation of
each candidate depends on the acquired problem–answer
strength. It is further assumed that there is a direct relation
between the activation level and the probability of retrieval.
Answers with a high associative strength will be retrieved,
but if the problem–answer associative strength does not
exceed a predeWned conWdence criterion, a procedural strat-
egy will be used in order to solve the problem. As contin-
ued practice strengthens problem–answer associations,
retrieval will be used more frequently, resulting in a
concomitant decrease in procedural strategy use. In a later
version of this model, the adaptive strategy choice model2
(ASCM; Siegler & Shipley, 1995), selection of an arithme-
tic strategy depends on its relative eYciency (i.e., speed and
accuracy). As a result of practice, problem-strategy associa-
tions increase, and this increase is as large for both retrieval
and procedural strategies. This model thus not only predicts
an increase in the use of retrieval strategies, but also an
increase in the use of more eYcient procedural strategies
(e.g., transformation) relative to less eYcient ones (e.g.,
counting). However, in the end, extensive practice should
result in exclusive retrieval use.
According to Logan’s (1988) instance theory of automa-
tization, each encounter with a stimulus initiates a race
between procedural and retrieval strategies. In the begin-
ning, the race is predominantly won by procedures. How-
ever, as each problem encounter is encoded and stored in
long-term memory, practice enhances retrieval speed but
not procedural speed. Consequently, as practice progresses,
the retrieval strategy will win the race. Otherwise stated,
practice enhances the amount of automatization, which reX-
ects a transition from performance based on procedural
strategies to performance based on memory retrieval.
However, since the use of procedural strategies persists
even in skilled adults, LeFevre et al. (1996) maintain that
practice will not always lead to increased usage of retrieval.
According to these authors, practice can also lead to the
automatic activation of procedural strategies. In this view,
associations between a speciWc problem and a procedure
are created and strengthened by the successful use of such
procedural strategies. Therefore, when people encounter
that problem, they will automatically activate a procedure
to solve that problem, without (or before) trying to retrieve
it from long-term memory. Practice will then not solely
lead to the replacement of procedures by fact retrieval, but
also to the replacement of less eYcient procedures by more
eYcient procedures. This view (see also Baroody, 1983,
1984, 1985) implies that the availability of eYcient proce-
dural skills would avoid the necessity of memorizing all the
basic number combinations. Consequently, many simple-
arithmetic problems might continue to be solved by using
procedural strategies.
Up until now, evidence concerning practice eVects on
strategy selection has only been shown for the alphabet
arithmetic task (e.g., Brigman & Cherry, 2002; Compton &
Logan, 1991; Hoyer, Cerella, & Onyper, 2003; Logan,
1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991, Rickard, 2004; ZbrodoV,
1999), for pseudo-arithmetic tasks (e.g., Onyper, Hoyer, &
Cerella, 2006; Rickard, 1997; Touron, Hoyer, & Cerella,
2004), and for arithmetic word problems (e.g., Lewis,
1989). The current study aims to contribute to this literature
by investigating practice eVects on strategy selection in
simple-arithmetic tasks.
The second question concerns practice eVects on strat-
egy eYciency. According to the distribution of associations
model (Siegler & Shrager, 1984), successive correct prac-
tice trials strengthen the link between a problem and its
answer. Since the time to retrieve and produce an answer is
proportional to the activation level of the corresponding
2 There exist several recent adaptations of the ASCM, such as the strat-
egy choice and discovery simulation (SCADS) model (Shrager &
Siegler, 1998), which incorporates the ASCM but also models
metacognitive processes to allow for the discovery of new strategies;
and the SCADS* model (Siegler & Araya, 2005), which adds six new
mechanisms to the SCADS model (i.e., controlled attention, interrup-
tion of procedures, verbalization, priming, forgetting, and dynamic
feature detection).123
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retrieval eYciency. The later version of this model, the
ASCM (Siegler & Shipley, 1995), predicts an increase in
the eYciency with which each strategy is executed, and
thus predicts higher eYciencies in both retrieval and proce-
dural strategies. Similar predictions can be made based on
Rickard’s (1997) theory of skill acquisition, the component
power law (CMPL). This theory explains increases in pro-
cedural eYciency as a function of increases in retrieval
eYciency. A computation is Wrst reduced to its simpler
parts, each of which is resolved by direct memory retrieval
(see also Anderson, 1993). Hence, both retrieval and proce-
dural eYciencies increase when memory traces are
strengthened.
The instance theory of automatization (Logan, 1988), in
contrast, assumes that the Wnishing times for procedures
stay the same while the Wnishing times for retrieval
decrease. This theory thus predicts practice eVects on
retrieval eYciency but not on procedural eYciency.
Finally, Baroody (1983, 1984, 1985) predicts rather the
opposite. According to his procedure-based theory, skill
acquisition is based on the replacement of slow procedural
strategies by faster, more automatic procedural strategies
rather than the replacement of procedures by direct memory
retrieval. He thus predicts stronger practice eVects on pro-
cedural eYciency than on retrieval eYciency.
EVects of practice on strategy eYciency have been
observed in standard arithmetic problems (e.g., Campbell,
1987, 1997; Fendrich et al., 1993; Pauli et al., 1998;
Rickard, 2005; Rickard & Bourne, 1996; Rickard et al., 1994,
Royer, Tronsky, Chan, Jackson, & Marchant, 1999), in
pseudo-arithmetic tasks (e.g., Onyper et al., 2006; Rickard,
1997; Touron et al., 2004), and in alphabet arithmetic tasks
(e.g., Brigman & Cherry, 2002; Compton & Logan, 1991;
Hoyer et al., 2003; Klapp, Boches, Trabert, & Logan, 1991;
Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991; Rickard, 2004). How-
ever, since most of these studies did not include trial-by-
trial strategy reports, it is not clear whether the faster
response times were due to changes in strategy eYciency
(i.e., faster strategy execution) or to changes in strategy
selection (i.e., more frequent use of faster strategies).
Compton and Logan (1991) and Rickard (1997, 2004)
included strategy reports on subsets of trials (e.g., on one-
sixth of the trials), whereas Logan and Klapp (1991) asked
participants—at the end of the experiment—to estimate the
percentage of trials on which they had used retrieval versus
counting strategies. Strategy reports on all trials have been
used in alphabet arithmetic tasks (e.g., Hoyer et al., 2003)
and in pseudo arithmetic tasks (e.g., Onyper et al., 2006;
Touron et al., 2004), but not yet in ‘pure’ simple-arithmetic
tasks. In the present study, trial-by-trial strategy reports are
used to investigate practice eVects on retrieval eYciency
and procedural eYciency separately.
Thirdly, the present study aims to test why the problem-
size eVect is modiWed by practice. The problem-size eVect
refers to the observation that large problems, such as 8 £ 9,
take longer to solve than small problems, such as 2 £ 3.
The problem-size eVect decreases as a result of practice,
both in ‘pure’ arithmetic tasks (e.g., Fendrich et al., 1993;
LeFevre & Liu, 1997; Pauli et al., 1998; Rickard & Bourne,
1996) and in the alphabet arithmetic task (e.g., Brigman &
Cherry, 2002; Logan, 1988; ZbrodoV, 1995). However,
practice never eliminated the problem-size eVect, even at
asymptotic response times. The problem-size eVect may
decrease in three ways: more frequent retrieval use for large
problems, more eYcient retrieval use for large problems, and
more eYcient procedural use for large numbers (Campbell &
Xue, 2001). The present study tests whether practice inXu-
ences all three of them.
The Wnal question raised concerns the transfer of prac-
tice to other operations, other sizes, or other arithmetic
problems. According to associative network theories (e.g.,
Campbell, 1987; Campbell & Graham, 1985), the instance
theory of automatization (Logan, 1988), and the identical
elements model (Rickard, 2005; Rickard et al., 1994), prac-
tice eVects are item-based rather than process-based. This
implies that practice involves learning speciWc responses to
speciWc stimuli. Consequently, transfer to novel stimuli and
situations should be inexistent.
According to the ASCM (Siegler & Shipley, 1995) and the
CMPL theory (Rickard, 1997), in contrast, practice enhances
both retrieval and procedural eYciencies. If it is further
assumed that procedures can be applied to several stimuli,
these models predict that practice eVects on simple-arithmetic
problems will transfer to complex-arithmetic problems. This
reasoning is also adopted in the procedure-based view of
Baroody (1983, 1984, 1985), which implies that procedural
strategy use is cognitively more economical than retrieval use
because it can be used on multiple problems.
Previous studies on mental arithmetic reported transfer
for highly related problems (e.g., commuted problems), but
not for other problems or other operations (e.g., Campbell,
1987; Fendrich, et al., 1993; Pauli et al., 1994; Rickard &
Bourne, 1996; Rickard et al., 1994). Pauli et al. (1998) even
did observe no overall transfer from practiced to new multi-
plication problems. Practice was thus item-speciWc and did
not facilitate arithmetic performance on problems that were
not practiced. More recently, Delazer et al. (2005) showed
that transfer from old to new complex addition problems
only occurred when procedural strategies had been practiced
but not when direct memory retrieval had been practiced.
We wondered whether the same strategy-dependent eVect of
transfer would be true when simple arithmetic is practiced.
The present study consists of two experiments, which
were conducted in order to formulate an answer to the four
questions outlined above.123
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In this experiment, participants had to solve simple-arith-
metic addition or multiplication problems. On the assump-
tion that small problems are usually solved more eYciently
than large problems (cf. the problem-size eVect), only large
problems were practiced. Participants were given 0, 3, or 6
practice sessions on the subset of largest problems. After
these practice sessions, a test session was administered, in
which both small and large problems had to be solved. The
latency data and strategy reports collected in the test ses-
sion were used to investigate practice eVects on strategy
eYciency and strategy selection, respectively. After the test
session, a test of complex arithmetic (the French kit) was
administered as well.
Method
Participants
Sixty Wrst-year psychology students (9 men and 51 women)
at Ghent University participated for course requirements
and credits. Their mean age was 19 years. They were
randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (Operation) £ 3 (Prac-
tice) design.
Procedure
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet room for
approximately 30, 45, or 60 min (dependent on the practice
condition). Two tasks were given to each participant. The
Wrst one was the simple-arithmetic task, which consisted of
simple additions (for one group of 30 participants) or sim-
ple multiplications (for another group of 30 participants).
Within each group, 10 participants did not practice, 10 par-
ticipants completed three practice sessions, and 10 partici-
pants completed six practice sessions. The test session was
administered after the practice sessions. The second task
was the French kit (French, Ekstrom, & Price, 1963), which
consists of complex-arithmetic problems that have to be
solved as quickly and accurately as possible. In the follow-
ing, both tasks are described more extensively.
Stimuli of the simple-arithmetic task consisted of simple
addition and simple multiplication problems. Both addition
and multiplication problems were composed of pairs of
numbers between 2 and 9, with tie problems (e.g., 3 + 3)
excluded. Problems involving 0 or 1 as an operand or
answer were also excluded. This resulted in 56 addition
problems (ranging from 2 + 3 to 8 + 9) and 56 multiplica-
tion problems (ranging from 2 £ 3 to 8 £ 9). Although all
problems were presented in the test session, only the most
diYcult problems were presented in the practice sessions.
The practice problems consisted of the 12 largest addition
problems and the 12 largest multiplication problems. For
addition, this selection included all problems with a sum
ranging from 14 to 17. For multiplication, this selection
included all problems with a product ranging from 45 to 72.
DeWnition of small and large problems was also based on
this selection: small problems were deWned as the not-
selected problems (i.e., the 44 smallest ones), whereas large
problems were deWned as the selected problems (i.e., the 12
largest ones). As noted before, there were three practice
conditions: 0, 3, or 6 practice sessions. Within each practice
session, all practice problems (i.e., the large ones) were pre-
sented twice, and in the test session all problems (small and
large ones) were presented twice. All problems were pre-
sented in Arabic format and in a randomized order within
one session.
A trial started with a Wxation point, which appeared for
500 ms. Then the arithmetic problem appeared horizontally
in the center of the screen, with the operation sign at the
Wxation point. The problem remained on screen until the
participant responded. In order to avoid biasing conditions,
no time deadline was set, because it has been shown that a
fast deadline increases reported use of retrieval, especially
for large problems (Campbell & Austin, 2002). A sound-
activated relay was activated when participants spoke their
answer aloud in a microphone, which was connected to a
software clock (accurate to 1 ms). The use of a voice-key
minimized general speeding eVects in motor responses dur-
ing practice. In previous research (e.g., Rickard et al., 1994)
participants often had to type in the answer on the numeric
key pad, so that improvements in motor aspects during
practice might have inXuenced overall performance. Pauli
et al. (1998) indeed showed decreases in both mental calcu-
lation time and motor response time across practice ses-
sions. All invalid trials (e.g., failures of the voice-activated
relay) were discarded, and (in the test session only) they
returned at the end of the session.
On each trial, accuracy was registered online by the
experimenter and feedback was presented to the partici-
pants, a green ‘Correct’ when their answer was correct, and
a red ‘Incorrect’ when it was not. Participants were also
told to report the strategy they used for each single prob-
lem. The reported strategy was recorded online by the
experimenter by pressing a predeWned number key on the
keyboard. Participants could choose one of the four strate-
gies described below (see e.g., Campbell & Gunter, 2002;
Campbell & Xue, 2001; Kirk & Ashcraft, 2001; LeFevre
et al., 1996; Seyler, Kirk, & Ashcraft, 2003): (1) Remem-
ber: You solve the problem by just remembering or know-
ing the answer directly from memory; (2) Counting: You
solve the problem by counting a certain number of times to
get the answer; (3) Transformation: You solve the problem
by referring to related operations or by deriving the answer
from some known facts; and (4) Other: You solve the123
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what strategy you used to solve the problem. These four
strategies were extensively explained by the experimenter,
with examples of both addition or multiplication problems
solved by each strategy as appropriate. It was emphasized
that the presented strategies were not meant to encourage
use of a particular strategy.
After the simple-arithmetic task, participants completed
two arithmetic subtests of the French kit (French et al.,
1963), one page of complex addition problems (e.g.,
39 + 90 + 82) and one page of complex subtraction and
multiplication problems (e.g., 48 £ 7). Each page con-
tained six rows of ten vertically oriented problems. Partici-
pants were given 2 min per page to solve the problems as
quickly and accurately as possible. Scores were deWned as
the total number of correctly solved problems per test.
Results
Across operations, 6.8% of the trials was spoiled due to
failures of the sound-activated relay. Since all the invalid
trials met in the test session returned at the end of this ses-
sion, most of them were recovered from data loss, which
reduced the trials due to failures of the sound-activated
relay to 0.5%. Further, all incorrect trials (3.0%) and all tri-
als on which participants selected the ‘Other’ category
(0.1%) were deleted. All response times (RTs) more than 4
standard deviations from each participant’s mean (per oper-
ation) were discarded as outliers (0.7%). Finally, one par-
ticipant (in the multiplication experiment with six practice
sessions) was discarded due to voice key problems. Every
analysis of variance (ANOVA) that has been executed was
based on the multivariate linear model. All reported results
are considered to be signiWcant if p < 0.05, unless men-
tioned otherwise. Although no prepractice test had been
administered, we may assume that all observed eVects were
due to the manipulated variables, given that the RTs in the
Wrst practice session did not diVer across groups (0£, 3£,
6£; F < 1).3
Strategy selection
Practice eVects on strategy selection were tested by means
of three separate ANOVAs—one for each strategy type
(retrieval, transformation, and counting; see Table 1).
These ANOVAs were run on percentages of strategy use in
the test session, with problem size (small vs. large) as
within-subjects variable and practice level (0£, 3£, 6£)
and operation (addition vs. multiplication) as between-sub-
jects variables. The ANOVA on percentages of retrieval
use showed no main eVect of practice level, F(2,53) = 2.11
(p = 0.13), but planned comparisons showed that 6£ prac-
ticed participants used the retrieval strategy more often than
did 3£ practiced participants, F(1,53) = 4.04, whereas
there was no diVerence between the 0£ and 3£ practiced
participants, F < 1. Conversely, the ANOVA on percent-
ages of counting use showed that 6£ practiced participants
used the counting strategy less often than 3£ practiced par-
ticipants did, F(1,53) = 5.49. Similarly, there was no diVer-
ence in counting use between the 0£ and 3£ practiced
participants, F < 1. The main eVect of practice level was
insigniWcant in the ANOVA on percentages of transforma-
tion use (F < 1).
Although, in all three ANOVAs, session interacted with
problem size, F(2,53) = 7.94 for retrieval, F(2,53) = 2.44
(p = 0.09) for transformation, and F(2,53) = 9.35 for count-
ing. For small (unpracticed) problems, the quantities of
retrieval, transformation, and counting use were equally
high across the 0£, 3£, and 6£ practiced participants (all
F’s < 1). For large (practiced) problems, in contrast, the
quantity of retrieval use signiWcantly increased across prac-
tice levels, F(1,53) = 6.25, whereas the quantities of count-
ing use signiWcantly decreased, F(1,53) = 11.17. The
quantity of transformation use on large problems also
decreased, but this eVect did not reach signiWcance,
F(1,53) = 1.30 (p = 0.25). Anyhow, even after practice,
retrieval was still used more frequently on small problems
(77%) than on large problems (60%), F(1,53) = 39.19.
Importantly, the problem-size eVect in terms of retrieval
3 Note that the design used in this Wrst experiment (i.e., without a pre-
test but with diVerent practice groups) has been used earlier (e.g.,
Rickard et al., 1994; Rickard & Bourne, 1996). We acknowledge that
the absence of a pretest is a drawback of the Wrst experiment. There-
fore, a pretest has been included in the second experiment.
Table 1 Percentages of retrieval, transformation, and counting use
as a function of problem size, operation, and practice level
(Experiment 1) 
Standard errors are shown in brackets
Addition Multiplication
Small Large Small Large
Retrieval
0£ practice 72 (7) 46 (9) 91 (7) 56 (9)
3£ practice 56 (4) 39 (9) 82 (7) 69 (9)
6£ practice 70 (7) 58 (9) 87 (7) 90 (10)
Transformation
0£ practice 24 (4) 50 (9) 3 (4) 21 (9)
3£ practice 21 (4) 54 (9) 3 (4) 25 (9)
6£ practice 24 (4) 42 (9) 3 (4) 9 (9)
Counting
0£ practice 3 (5) 3 (4) 6 (5) 23 (4)
3£ practice 23 (5) 6 (4) 15 (5) 6 (4)
6£ practice 6 (5) 0 (4) 9 (5) 0 (4)123
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use on large problems) was signiWcantly higher for the 0£
practiced participants (31%) than for the 3£ practiced par-
ticipants (15%) and the 6£ practiced participants (4%),
F(1,53) = 5.89 and F(1,53) = 15.58, respectively.
Finally, we tested whether there were diVerences across
the operations. Retrieval was used more frequently on mul-
tiplication (79%) than on addition (57%), F(1,53) = 13.28,
whereas transformation was used more frequently on addi-
tion (36%) than on multiplication (11%), F(1,53) = 24.46.
Counting was used as frequently on addition (7%) and mul-
tiplication (10%), F < 1. Importantly, the eVect of operation
did not interact with any other variable in any of the three
ANOVAs.
Strategy eYciency
In order to test practice eVects on strategy eYciency, an
ANOVA on RTs in the test session was performed with
practice level (0£, 3£, 6£) and operation (addition vs.
multiplication) as between-subjects variables, and problem
size (small vs. large) and strategy (retrieval vs. procedural)
as within-subjects variables (see Table 2).4 Obviously, the
main eVect of strategy reached signiWcance, F(1,53) =
124.17; with procedural RTs (2,033 ms) being higher than
retrieval RTs (1,021 ms). This result indicates that partici-
pants’ verbal strategy reports are highly reliable. The main
eVect of practice level was signiWcant as well,
F(2,53) = 6.07. RTs were larger for the 0£ practice level
(1,835 ms) than for both 3£ and 6£ practice levels (1,300
and 1,446 ms), F(1,53) = 11.38 and F(1,53) = 5.85, respec-
tively. RTs did not diVer between 3£ and 6£ practice lev-
els, F < 1. Practice level interacted with strategy,
F(2,53) = 9.89, and with operation, F(2,53) = 4.43. Prac-
ticed participants were more eYcient in performing proce-
dural strategies than unpracticed participants,
F(1,53) = 14.77, whereas practiced and unpracticed partici-
pants were equally eYcient in the retrieval strategy, F < 1.
Furthermore, participants did not diVer in eYciency on
additions, F < 1, but practiced participants were more
eYcient than unpracticed participants on multiplications,
F(1,53) = 19.78. The three-way interaction between prac-
tice level, strategy, and operation, F(2,53) = 9.61, con-
Wrmed that practiced participants were better than
unpracticed participants in solving multiplication problems
with procedural strategies, F(1,53) = 27.79, but not in solv-
ing multiplication problems via retrieval, F < 1, nor in solv-
ing addition problems with retrieval or procedural
strategies (each F < 1).
There was no interaction between problem size and prac-
tice level, F(2,53) = 1.69 (p = 0.19). Planned comparisons
conWrmed that the retrieval problem-size eVect (i.e.,
retrieval RTs large problems ¡ retrieval RTs small prob-
lems) was signiWcant in all groups and did not diVer across
groups, neither for addition nor for multiplication (each
F < 1). The procedural problem-size eVect (i.e., procedural
RTs large problems ¡ procedural RTs small problems) for
multiplication was signiWcantly larger for the 0£ practice
group than for the 3£ practice group, F(1,53) = 5.55, but
equally large in the 3£ and 6£ practice groups,
F(1,53) = 1.72 (p = 0.20). The procedural problem-size
4 As the amount of counting strategy use is very low (cf. Tables 1, 3),
we decided to put counting RTs and transformation RTs together.
These procedural RTs are then contrasted with the retrieval RTs. Al-
though, since (a) not all strategies were used across all the practice ses-
sions, and (b) only RTs of the correctly solved problems were
analyzed, for some subjects empty cells occurred in the practice level
£ operation £ size £ strategy ANOVA. We replaced these empty cells
for each participant with the correct RT of the corresponding cell [i.e.,
the mean RT (over participants) of the practice level £ operation £
size £ strategy cell]. Obviously, this procedure was only needed in the
ANOVAs on strategy eYciency and not in the ANOVAs on strategy
selection. The number of cells replaced was 10 (out of 240) in Experi-
ment 1 and 34 (out of 320) in Experiment 2.
Table 2 Retrieval and procedural response times (in ms) as a function
of problem size, operation, and practice level (Experiment 1) 
Standard errors are shown in brackets
Addition Multiplication
Small Large Small Large
Retrieval
0£ practice 889 (59) 986 (103) 1,041 (59) 1,300 (103)
3£ practice 795 (59) 957 (103) 994 (59) 1,212 (103)
6£ practice 838 (59) 923 (103) 1,025 (62) 1,296 (109)
Procedural
0£ practice 1,282 (327) 1,303 (260) 3,666 (327) 4,213 (260)
3£ practice 1,146 (327) 1,115 (260) 2,272 (327) 1,908 (260)
6£ practice 1,418 (327) 1,311 (260) 2,300 (344) 2,457 (274)
Table 3 Percentages of retrieval, transformation, and counting use as
a function of problem size, operation, and session (Experiment 2) 
Standard errors are shown in brackets
Addition Multiplication
Small Large Small Large
Retrieval
Pretest 77 (3) 46 (7) 94 (3) 69 (7)
Posttest 74 (3) 57 (6) 94 (3) 84 (6)
Transformation
Pretest 20 (2) 52 (7) 4 (2) 30 (7)
Posttest 20 (2) 43 (6) 2 (2) 16 (6)
Counting
Pretest 4 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1) 1 (1)
Posttest 6 (2) 0 (0) 3 (2) 0 (0)123
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F < 1). These results indicate that the eVect of practice on
the problem-size eVect originates from more eYcient pro-
cedural strategy use, an eVect that seems to be reliable for
multiplication only.
Transfer eVects
As mentioned before, an additional test of complex-arith-
metic performance (the French kit) was administered for
each participant. Since this test was administered after the
test session (and thus after the practice sessions for the
practiced participants), scores on this test are suggestive for
transfer eVects of simple-arithmetic practice on complex-
arithmetic performance. An operation (addition or multipli-
cation) £ practice level (0£, 3£, 6£) ANOVA was run for
each subtest of the French kit (i.e., the addition subtest and
the subtraction-multiplication subtest). For the addition
subtest, no signiWcant eVects appeared (each F < 1), indi-
cating no transfer eVects at all. For the subtraction-multipli-
cation subtest, in contrast, both main eVects were
signiWcant. The practiced participants (3£ and 6£) per-
formed signiWcantly better than the unpracticed (0£) par-
ticipants, F(1,53) = 5.1 (means of 17.0, 16.7, and 13.8,
respectively), indicating a transfer eVect from simple to
complex problems. Participants who had practiced multipli-
cation problems performed signiWcantly better than partici-
pants who had practiced addition problems, F(1,55) = 5.5
(means of 17.4 and 14.3, respectively), indicating that the
transfer eVect was operation-speciWc.
Summary
Practice resulted in more frequent retrieval use, less fre-
quent counting use, more eYcient retrieval use, and more
eYcient procedural use. We may thus conclude that prac-
tice inXuenced both strategy selection and strategy
eYciency. However, the eVects on strategy eYciency
were operation-speciWc, as they were only apparent for
multiplication and not for addition. Similarly, transfer
eVects from simple to complex problems were only sig-
niWcant for multiplication. The problem-size eVect,
Wnally, was reduced but did not completely disappear.
Practice eVects on the problem-size eVect were associ-
ated with more frequent retrieval use and more eYcient
procedural use for large problems, but not with more
eYcient retrieval use for large problems. All these inter-
esting observations notwithstanding, this experiment had
one drawback: There was no pretest. Experiment 2 was
meant to investigate the results obtained in Experiment 1
more thoroughly, by including both a pretest and a
posttest.
Experiment 2
The present experiment diVered from Experiment 1 in three
aspects. First, Experiment 2 included both a pretest and a
posttest, whereas Experiment 1 only included a posttest. In
the pretest, participants had to solve all (i.e., both small and
large) problems once. In the following practice sessions,
only the large problems were practiced. In the posttest, all
problems (small and large ones) had to be solved again.
Second, a speeded veriWcation task was included. This task
was administered twice: once before the pretest and once
after the posttest. This task was meant to test whether the
practice eVects on retrieval use observed in Experiment 1
were due to a real change in the retrieval network (i.e., the
sensitivity) or to response biases. Indeed, trial-by-trial strat-
egy reports have been criticized (e.g., Kirk & Ashcraft,
2001), since participants’ strategy reports may easily be
biased by the experimenter’s suggestions. More speciW-
cally, participants might want to please the experimenter by
reporting more frequent retrieval use without really using
retrieval more frequently. As explained below, signal-
detection theory can be used to disentangle real practice
eVects on strategy selection from eVects caused by response
biases. Third, since Experiment 1 showed that three prac-
tice sessions were enough to obtain sensitive diVerences
with the control condition, the number of practice sessions
was restricted to three. All participants thus took part in a
simple-arithmetic task consisting of a pretest, three practice
sessions, and a posttest.
Method
Participants
Forty students (9 men and 31 women) at Ghent University
participated in this Experiment. Half of them participated
for course requirements and credits; the other half received
D 10 for participation. Their mean age was 20 years. None
of them had participated in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Twenty participants completed simple addition problems
and 20 participants completed simple multiplication prob-
lems. All participants also had to solve a complex-arithme-
tic test (the French kit) and to participate in a speeded
veriWcation task. The basic procedure of this second experi-
ment was identical to the one used in Experiment 1, except
the three changes described above. Hence, only the aspects
of the procedure that were diVerent for this experiment
(e.g., the inclusion of a speeded veriWcation task) are
described underneath.123
Psychological Research (2008) 72:528–541 535In the speeded veriWcation task, participants had to ver-
ify simple additions or simple multiplications, depending
on the operation they had to solve in the simple-arithmetic
production task. Stimuli of the speeded veriWcation task
were presented in standard form (i.e., a + b = c or a £
b = c) in which a and b were one-digit numbers from 2 to 9.
Half of the problems were presented with a correct solu-
tion, whereas the other half were presented with an incor-
rect solution. The incorrect addition solutions were one or
two units larger or smaller than the correct sum (e.g.,
7 + 2 = 11). The incorrect multiplication solutions were 10
or 20% larger or smaller than the correct product (e.g.,
3 £ 4 = 10). To reduce interference eVects, stimuli were
excluded when (a) c = a £ b for addition problems (e.g.,
3 + 2 = 6) or c = a + b for multiplication problems (e.g.,
2 £ 3 = 5), (b) c = a or c = b (e.g., 2 + 2 = 2), (c) c = N £ a
or N £ b for multiplication problems (e.g., 4 £ 5 = 16), and
(d) c is even (uneven) while the correct solution is uneven
(even) (e.g., 3 £ 5 = 14).
The veriWcation task consisted of 8 practice trials and 80
experimental trials. A trial started with a Wxation point for
500 ms, after which the stimulus was presented until the
participants responded or until the response deadline was
met. The response deadlines were based on the retrieval
RTs of the 0£ practice group in Experiment 1 and were cal-
culated with the following formula: [mean retrieval
RT + 2 £ standard deviation of retrieval RT]. This mea-
sure was calculated separately for addition (1,274 ms) and
multiplication (1,552 ms). After each practice trial, feed-
back was provided for 1 s, consisting of the word(s) “Cor-
rect” (when the answer was correct), “Incorrect” (when the
answer was incorrect), or “Respond faster!” (when the par-
ticipant’s response was slower than the response deadline).
When the participant answered within the response dead-
line, his/her response time appeared on the screen as well.
No feedback was provided in the experimental trials,
although participants were strongly recommended to
answer as fast and accurately as possible. All RTs higher
than the response deadlines were discarded. The inter-trial
interval was 500 ms. The speeded veriWcation task was
administered twice: one before practice and once after prac-
tice.
Results
In the simple-arithmetic test, 7.0% of the trials were spoiled
due to failures of the sound-activated relay. Since all the
invalid trials met in the test session returned at the end of
this session, most of them were recovered from data loss,
which reduced the trials due to failures of the sound-acti-
vated relay to 0.5%. Further, all incorrect trials (3.5%) and
all trials on which participants selected the ‘Other’ category
(0.4%) were deleted. All RTs more than 4 standard devia-
tions from each participant’s mean (per operation) were
discarded as outliers (0.7%).
Strategy selection
In order to test practice eVects on strategy selection, we ran
three separate ANOVAs—one for each strategy type
(retrieval, transformation, and counting; see Table 3).
These ANOVAs were run on percentages of strategy use,
with problem size (small vs. large) and session (pre vs.
post) as within-subjects variables, and operation (addition
vs. multiplication) as between-subjects variable. Percent-
ages of retrieval use were higher in the posttest (77%) than
in the pretest (71%), F(1,38) = 8.68, whereas percentages
of transformation use were lower in the posttest (20%) than
in the pretest (26%), F(1,38) = 8.79. The amount of count-
ing use did not change between the pretest (3%) and the
posttest (3%), F < 1.
In all three ANOVAs, session interacted with problem
size, F(1,38) = 21.88 for retrieval, F(1,38) = 13.51 for
transformation, and F(1,38) = 4.78 for counting. For small
(unpracticed) problems, the quantities of retrieval, transfor-
mation, and counting use stayed equally high across the
sessions (all p’s > 0.10). For large (practiced) problems, in
contrast, the quantity of retrieval use signiWcantly
increased, F(1,38) = 15.13, whereas the quantities of trans-
formation and counting use signiWcantly decreased,
F(1,38) = 49.63 and F(1,38) = 230.78, respectively. Impor-
tantly, the problem-size eVect in terms of retrieval use (i.e.,
% retrieval use on small problems ¡ % retrieval use on
large problems) was higher before practice (85% vs. 57%)
than after practice (84% vs. 71%).
Finally, we tested whether there were diVerences across
the operations. As in Experiment 1, retrieval was used more
frequently on multiplication (85%) than on addition (63%),
F(1,38) = 13.43, whereas transformation was used more
frequently on addition (34%) than on multiplication (13%),
F(1,38) = 13.99. Counting was used as frequently on addi-
tion (3%) and multiplication (2%), F < 1. Importantly, the
eVect of operation did not interact with any other variable
in any of the three ANOVAs.
Strategy eYciency
Practice eVects on strategy eYciency were tested with an
ANOVA on RTs with problem size (small vs. large), ses-
sion (pre vs. post) and strategy (retrieval vs. procedural) as
within-subjects variables, and operation (addition vs. multi-
plication) as between-subjects variable (see Table 4 and
footnote 4). Obviously, the main eVect of strategy reached
signiWcance, F(1,38) = 77.55; with procedural RTs
(1,466 ms) being larger than retrieval RTs (917 ms). Partic-
ipants thus seemed to report reliably the strategies they123
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pretest (1,216 ms), F(1,38) = 4.08. This was true for both
retrieval and procedural strategies, as appears from the
insigniWcant session £ strategy interaction, F < 1.
The main eVect of problem size did not reach signiW-
cance, F(1,38) = 1.13, but the interactions problem size £
strategy and problem size £ strategy £ operation did,
F(1,38) = 25.93 and F(1,38) = 4.75, respectively. The
retrieval problem-size eVect (i.e., retrieval RTs large prob-
lems ¡ retrieval RTs small problems) was signiWcant for
both addition and multiplication, F(1,38) = 15.65 and
F(1,38) = 38.48, respectively. Moreover, it did not change
across sessions, F < 1 for addition and F(1,38) = 1.64 for
multiplication. The procedural problem-size eVect (i.e.,
procedural RTs large problems ¡ procedural RTs small
problems), in contrast, was not signiWcant for addition,
F < 1, but inversed for multiplication, F(1,38) = 6.98. More
speciWcally, procedures were executed faster on large (i.e.,
practiced) multiplication problems than on small (i.e.,
unpracticed) multiplication problems. Obviously, this was
only true in the posttest, F(1,38) = 8.73 and not in the pre-
test, F < 1. In conclusion, practice enhanced the procedural
eYciency for multiplication but not for addition.
Transfer eVects
As in Experiment 1, an additional test of complex-arithme-
tic performance (the French kit) was administered after the
posttest. Separate ANOVAs were run for each subtest of
the French kit (i.e., the addition subtest and the subtraction-
multiplication subtest) with operation (addition or multipli-
cation) as the only independent variable. Participants
having practiced simple additions scored slightly better on
the complex-addition test than participants having practiced
simple multiplications (15.6 vs. 14.9, respectively), but this
eVect did not reach signiWcance, F < 1. The same was true
for the complex-multiplication test, on which participants
having practiced simple multiplications scored (insigniW-
cantly) better than participants having practiced simple
additions (17.8 vs. 16.7, respectively), F < 1.
Speeded veriWcation
The data of the speeded-veriWcation task were analyzed
with the help of the signal-detection theory in order to ver-
ify the validity of the participants’ strategy reports. All tri-
als on which participants had veriWed a correct addition or
multiplication problem as correct were coded as hits. All
trials on which participants had veriWed an incorrect addi-
tion or multiplication problem as correct were coded as
false alarms. Using the software program of Van der Goten
and Vandierendonck (1997), the signal-detection theory
was used to determine the sensitivity (d’) and the response
bias (c) (see Table 5). A 2 £ 2 ANOVA was conducted on
these d’ and c values, with operation (addition vs. multipli-
cation) as between-subjects variable and session (pre vs.
post) as within-subjects variable. The ANOVA on the sen-
sitivity (d’) showed a signiWcant main eVect of operation,
indicating that the sensitivity was higher for multiplication
(3.23) than for addition (2.08), F(1,38) = 24.91. Moreover,
the increase in sensitivity (pre vs. post) tended to be signiW-
cant for multiplication, F(1,38) = 3.67 (p = 0.06) but not for
addition, F < 1. The ANOVA on response bias (c) showed
no signiWcant eVects (highest F = 2.99, p = 0.10). The prac-
tice eVects on strategy selection could thus be attributed to
real diVerences rather than to changes in response biases.
Summary
As in Experiment 1, practice inXuenced both strategy selec-
tion and strategy eYciency. Indeed, direct memory retrieval
was used more frequent after practice than before, transfor-
mation was used less frequent after practice than before,
and retrieval and procedural use were more eYcient after
practice than before. Also as in Experiment 1, practice
eVects on strategy eYciency were larger for multiplication
than for addition. The current experiment also conWrmed
that the problem-size eVect was reduced by more frequent
Table 4 Retrieval and procedural response times (in ms) as a function
of problem size, operation, and session (Experiment 2) 
Standard errors are shown in brackets
Addition Multiplication
Small Large Small Large
Retrieval
Pretest 741 (45) 904 (93) 941 (45) 1,222 (93)
Posttest 706 (37) 847 (65) 889 (37) 1,084 (65)
Procedural
Pretest 1,193 (137) 1,182 (119) 1,823 (137) 1,722 (119)
Posttest 1,156 (146) 1,104 (83) 1,941 (146) 1,606 (83)
Table 5 Values of sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) as a function
of session and operation (Experiment 2) 
Standard errors are shown between brackets
Sensitivity (d’) Response bias (c)
Addition Multiplication Addition Multiplication
Prepractice 2.1 (0.2) 3.1 (0.2) ¡0.1 (0.1) ¡0.1 (0.1)
Postpractice 2.1 (0.2) 3.4 (0.2) ¡0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1)123
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more eYcient retrieval use. Finally, the speeded-veriWca-
tion task showed that the eVects on strategy selection could
not be attributed to response bias eVects.
General discussion
The present study revealed some remarkable Wndings con-
cerning the eVects of practice on simple-arithmetic perfor-
mance. First, practice enhanced the frequency of retrieval
use and reduced the frequency of procedural strategy use,
and thus inXuenced strategy selection. Second, as retrieval
RTs were lower after practice than before, retrieval
eYciency was improved by practice as well. Third, practice
augmented procedural eYciency, because procedural RTs
decreased as a result of practice. Fourth, participants who
had been practicing simple-arithmetic problems were better
in a complex-arithmetic test than were unpracticed partici-
pants (cf. Experiment 1), which indicates transfer from sim-
ple to complex-arithmetic problems. However, this was not
conWrmed in Experiment 2. In the following, tentative
answers to the four questions formulated in the Introduction
(i.e., practice eVects on strategy selection, on strategy
eYciency, on the problem-size eVect, and transfer eVects)
are proposed on the basis of the present Wndings. We also
check which arithmetic models are best Wt to explain the
results observed in this study.
Practice eVects on strategy selection
Practice eVects on strategy selection were signiWcant in
both experiments and for both operations. The increase in
retrieval use was accompanied with a decrease in the use of
counting strategies in Experiment 1, and with a decrease in
the use of transformation strategies in Experiment 2. This
diVerence across experiments is probably due to inter-indi-
vidual diVerences. The participants in Experiment 1 used
the counting strategy rather frequently (cf. Table 1), and
practice caused them to replace these counting strategies by
transformation and/or retrieval strategies. As the partici-
pants in Experiment 2 used the counting strategy very
rarely (cf. Table 3), they mainly switched from transforma-
tion use to direct memory retrieval.
However, the increase in reported retrieval use as a
result of practice might be questioned, as it might be biased
by demand eVects (e.g., Kirk & Ashcraft, 2001). In that
case, participants would (falsely) report more frequent
retrieval use without really using retrieval more frequently.
A signal detection analysis was used to disentangle eVects
caused by response bias and real practice eVects. The
results of this analysis suggest that the practice eVects on
retrieval frequency were likely not due to changes in the
participants’ response biases but to real sensitivity diVer-
ences (i.e., changes in the memory network).
The increase in retrieval use as a result of practice can be
explained by experience-based models (Siegler & Shipley,
1995; Siegler & Shrager, 1984) as well as by the instance
theory of automatization (Logan, 1988), whereas the switch
from less eYcient to more eYcient procedural strategies
can be accounted for by Siegler’s models but not by
Logan’s model. Note, however, that the frequency of
retrieval use never reached 100%. Participants were quite
rigid in their strategy choices and continued to use proce-
dural strategies across the experiment. This observation
cannot be accounted for by the models discussed above, as
these models predict exclusive retrieval use after extensive
practice. However, it is also possible that the amount of
practice was not extensive enough. Future research might
investigate whether more extensive practice would result in
exclusive retrieval use.
The reasonably high amount of procedural use after
practice is in agreement with Baroody’s (1983, 1984, 1985)
theory, which states that people prefer procedures above
retrieval because procedural knowledge is cognitively more
economical than storing all individual facts in long-term
memory. As the storage capacity of long-term memory is
unknown, although, this assertion of economy might make
no sense. Indeed, in terms of working memory, it is clear
that procedural strategy use is less economical than retrieval
strategy use. Procedural strategies are slower (even after
practice) and require more working-memory resources than
retrieval strategies do (Imbo & Vandierendonck, in press
a, b). Moreover, since transformation strategies often
require the retrieval of arithmetic facts, memorization of
facts is obligatory for procedural strategy use as well.
Baroody’s theory is thus unable to explain the replacement
of ‘pure’ procedural strategies (such as counting) by pro-
cedural strategies with a retrieval component (such as
transformation).
Finally, LeFevre et al. (1996) also argue that procedural
strategies are maintained, even after intensive practice. This
can be explained by assuming that the association between
a problem and an eYcient procedure (e.g., transformation)
is as strong as (or even stronger than) the direct association
between that problem and its answer. Procedural strategies
are then automatically activated, without (or before) the
answer is retrieved. This reasoning may also explain why
changes in strategy selection are hard to make: when people
perceive their commonly used procedural strategy as
eYcient, why should they switch to retrieval?
Practice eVects on strategy eYciency
Practice enhanced strategy eYciency. In Experiment 1, pro-
cedural RTs decreased as a result of practice but retrieval123
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procedural RTs decreased as a result of practice. The
ASCM (Siegler & Shipley, 1995) and the CMPL theory
(Rickard, 1997) predict higher eYciencies in both retrieval
and procedural strategies. The instance theory of automati-
zation (Logan, 1988), in contrast, predicts practice eVects
on retrieval eYciency but not on procedural eYciency,
whereas Baroody (1983, 1984, 1985) predicts rather the
opposite.
The fact that practice eVects diVer across strategies,
poses problems to the frequently used power law of Newell
and Rosenbloom (1981),5 which predicts a negatively
accelerating rate of speedup as a function of practice. Based
on our results, we argue that this law should not be applied
to overall latencies, i.e., retrieval and procedural latencies
combined. In contrast, we believe that this law should be
applied to retrieval and procedural strategies separately.
Delaney, Reder, Staszewski, and Ritter (1998) re-analyzed
data obtained in previous practice studies with complex-
arithmetic problems. They indeed observed that the
improvement in latencies was better explained by practice
on a strategy than by practice on the task as a whole. This
has also been conWrmed by Rickard (1997), who showed
that the power law does not hold for practice eVects on
overall latency data, but does hold within each strategy.
Another interesting observation with regard to strategy
eYciency was that practice eVects on strategy eYciency
were larger for multiplication than for addition, and espe-
cially when multiplications were solved by procedural
strategies. Comparable eVects have been observed in a pre-
vious study (Imbo, Vandierendonck, & Rosseel, 2007), in
which arithmetic experience inXuenced strategy selection
and strategy eYciency for multiplication problems only.
There are several possible explanations for this eVect. First,
addition problems are generally solved faster than multipli-
cation problems (cf. Tables 2, 4). Hence, increasing the
strategy eYciency is easier for multiplication than it is for
addition. Second, the procedures used to solve multiplica-
tion problems might be more consistent than those used to
solve addition problems. Multiplication problems with a 9
(e.g., 9 £ 7), for example, were consistently solved with
the ‘ten rule’ (e.g., 9 £ 7 = 10 £ 7 ¡ 7 = 70 ¡ 7 = 63).
Once this rule is suYciently mastered, people are able to
use this rule very eYciently (i.e., very fast and accurately).
The available rules are less consistent for addition,
and most of them involve counting, which is very time-
consuming.
The problem-size eVect
The present results showed that practice inXuenced only
two out of three sources of the problem-size eVect. First,
practicing large problems inXuenced strategy selection,
since retrieval was used more often on the practiced (i.e.,
large) problems as a result of practice. Consequently, the
diVerence in retrieval use between large and small prob-
lems became smaller, reducing the problem-size eVect.
Second, practicing large problems did not change the
retrieval problem-size eVect. Retrieval was always slower
for large problems than for small problems, and the diVer-
ence in retrieval eYciency between large and small prob-
lems was not reduced by practice. Third, practicing large
problems did change the procedural problem-size eVect.
Since procedures became faster for large problems as prac-
tice progressed, the procedural problem-size eVect
decreased. In Experiment 2, the decrease was so strong that
the problem-size eVect for multiplication inversed. We
might thus conclude that more frequent retrieval use on
large problems and more eYcient procedural use on large
problems reduced the problem-size eVect as a result of
practice. The diVerence in retrieval eYciency between
small and large problems was not inXuenced by practice.
The retrieval problem-size eVect was never eliminated
(i.e., large problems were always retrieved more slowly than
were small problems), even at asymptotic response times,
which is in line with previous research (e.g., Fendrich et al.,
1993; Pauli et al., 1998). Yet, several models predict that the
problem-size eVect should disappear with intensive practice
if only retrieval strategies would be used (e.g., Logan, 1988;
Siegler & Shipley, 1995; Siegler & Shrager, 1984). The
robustness of the retrieval problem-size eVect indicates that
large problems must have some inherent diYculties in com-
parison with small problems. There are only a few models
that oVer candidate explanations for such inherent diVer-
ences. In Campbell’s network-interference model (1995),
the presentation of an arithmetic problem primes both the
correct answer and its associated (incorrect) answers. Since
large problems have more associated answers than small
problems, interference is larger for large problems than that
for small problems. Since this explanation attributes the
problem-size eVect to structural aspects of memory repre-
sentations, it should not be eliminated by practice. Similarly,
in the interacting neighbors model of Verguts and Fias
(2005), the problem-size eVect arises because solutions of
small problems are more consistent with their neighboring
answers than are solutions of large problems.
Can the problem-size eVect then ever disappear? Yes, it
can, albeit only in extraordinary cases. For example, Geary
(1996) observed no problem-size eVect in (probably exten-
sively practiced) Chinese children, and Pauli, Lutzenberger,
Birbaumer, Rickard, and Bourne (1996) observed no
5 T = BN¡ in which T represents the performance time, B is the time
taken to perform the Wrst trial, N is the trial number, and  represents
the rate at which performance time changes.123
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thus produces inherent changes in strategy eYciencies, which
can only be overcome, if at all, by very extensive practice.
Transfer eVects
Calculation skill learning is very speciWc, since practice
eVects were limited to the operation that had been prac-
ticed. Practice eVects did transfer over complexity though,
as practiced participants were better than unpracticed par-
ticipants in solving complex-arithmetic facts (cf. Experi-
ment 1). It should be noted that transfer only occurred for
multiplication but not for addition in Experiment 1, and
was (insigniWcantly) larger for multiplication than for addi-
tion in Experiment 2.
The results thus indicate that transfer eVects occur rather
rarely, and were limited to procedural strategies and absent
for retrieval strategies. This might be explained by the fact
that procedures are applicable to several problems, whereas
retrieval is item-speciWc. The data seem to conWrm this state-
ment. Indeed, (a) practice enhanced procedural eYciencies
more strongly for multiplication than for addition, and (b)
transfer occurred more clearly for multiplication than for
addition. Stronger transfer eVects for procedural strategies
than for retrieval have been observed previously (e.g., Camp-
bell, Fuchs-Lacelle, & Phenix, 2006; Delazer et al., 2005).
The observation of transfer eVects is in agreement with
Baroody’s theory (1983, 1984, 1985), which emphasizes the
economy and all-round applicability of procedural knowl-
edge. Our data are also in agreement with the identical ele-
ments model of Rickard (2005; Rickard et al., 1994),
although his theory is more retrieval-based (i.e., suited for
simple-arithmetic performance after extended practice) than
the theories of Baroody (1983, 1984, 1985), which are more
procedure-based. The identical elements model assumes a
distinct abstract representation for each unique combination
of the basic elements (i.e., the operands and the required
operation). Transfer is thus possible within the same opera-
tion but not between operations, which was observed in the
present study. Rickard’s (1997) CMPL theory is also consis-
tent with transfer from simple to complex problems, pro-
vided that the retrievals involved in simple-arithmetic
problem solving (e.g., 6 + 7) are also required in complex-
arithmetic problem solving (e.g., 16 + 7). Finally, the
instance theory of automatization (Logan, 1988) predicts
that transfer to novel stimuli should be poor to nonexistent.
As automatization is item-based rather than process-based,
it involves learning speciWc responses to speciWc stimuli.
Summary
In reviewing several theories and models, we discovered
that each model has its strengths and weaknesses. However,
no model could explain all practice eVects observed. The
instance theory of automatization (Logan, 1988) was able
to explain the replacement of procedural strategies by direct
memory retrieval and the increase in retrieval eYciency.
Practice eVects on procedural eYciency and the concomi-
tant transfer eVects, in contrast, could not be explained by
this theory. The latter two eVects Wt very well in the proce-
dure-based theory of Baroody (1983, 1984, 1985), which is
silent about increases in retrieval eYciency and retrieval
frequency, though. The ASCM of Siegler and Shipley
(1995) and the CMPL theory of Rickard (1997) were able
to explain practice eVects on strategy selection, retrieval
eYciency, and procedural eYciency.
Clearly, we need an integrative model that could account
for all the practice eVects we observed. Instead of develop-
ing a new model, we believe that previously developed
models can readily be modiWed in order to account for our
data. The ASCM (Siegler & Shipley, 1995), for example,
assumes that a particular strategy is selected when that
strategy can be executed eYciently. Because retrieval is
generally the fastest and most accurate strategy, this strat-
egy will be selected. Yet, when a nonretrieval strategy can
be executed with reasonable speed and accuracy, this strat-
egy also has chances to be selected. The ASCM further pre-
dicts that successful strategy execution strengthens
problem–answer associations, which results in virtually
100% retrieval use. As we observed that many participants
continued to use nonretrieval strategies, we propose a
slightly modiWed version of the ASCM, in which problem-
strategy association strengths are maintained relative to
problem–answer association strengths. Nonretrieval strate-
gies might then be automatically activated, and, conse-
quently, initiated before retrieval. This slightly modiWed
version of the ASCM would guarantee the continued, if
infrequent, use of nonretrieval strategies.
A Wnal question is whether people with strong problem-
strategy associations will ever switch to retrieval strategies.
To ensure progress in people’s strategy selection process,
the ASCM should incorporate two architectural features
that are included in the CMPL theory (Rickard, 1997) as
well: (a) nonretrieval strategy execution strengthens
retrieval nodes but not vice versa, and (b) retrievals actively
inhibit nonretrieval strategies but not vice versa. DiVeren-
tial parameters across participants might then explain why
some people are 100% retrieval users and others are not.
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